Abstract
Public-key cryptography is an ubiquitous building-block of modern telecommunication technology. Among the most historically important types, the knapsack-based encryption schemes, from the early years of public-key cryptography, performed particularly well in computational resources (time and memory), and mathematical and algorithmic simplicity. Although their widespread adoption was readily curtailed by effective cryptanalyses to several different attempts, the question of whether or not there is any future for actual usage of knapsack-based asymmetric encryption schemes, and all its potential advantages remains unsettled. The goal of this paper is to present a novel construction, which offer consistent security improvements on knapsack-based cryptography. We propose two improvements upon the original knapsack cryptosystem that address the most important types of attacks: the Diaphantine approximations-based attacks and the lattice problems oracle attacks. The proposed defenses demonstrably preclude the aforementioned types of attacks.